America: The World’s Mediator? by Brilmayer, Lea
HeinOnline -- 51 Ala. L. Rev. 715 1999-2000
1999 DANIEL J. MEADOR LECTURE:
AMERICA: THE WORLD'S MEDIATOR?
Lea Brilmayer·
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War brought about a substantial re-
structuring of many aspects of the international political system,
including its method for managing disputes. Under the Cold
War's regime of bi-polarity, typically one of the "superpowers"
would line up behind one participant to the dispute and the
other "superpower" would line up behind the other. Bi-polarity
frustrated dispute resolution because each of the disputing
states would then have access to economic and military support,
to the friendship of a permanent member of the Security Coun-
cil, and to a network of alliances. The result, most commonly,
was deadlock. The end of the Cold War seemed to bring hopes of
avoiding such paralysis. The United States of America stepped
into a new role, and as "the only remaining superpower" it took
an increasingly active role in managing the disputes of other
states.
At one point the United States flirted with the role of
"world's policeman." It still on occasion actively engages militari-
ly in disputes around the world. But of course military involve-
ment is expensive, both economically and in risk to American
lives. The role of "world's policeman" has not been popular do-
mestically, particularly where the use of ground troops is re-
quired. Military involvement is therefore mostly restricted to
situations where either the United States can accomplish what
it wants by use of unchallenged air power (as in Kosovo) or it
believes that it has a direct and primary interest of its own (as
in Iraq).
Having rejected the role of "world's policeman" as too costly,
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the United States has now embraced the role of "world's media-
tor." From Northern Ireland to the former Yugoslavia, from
Africa to the Middle East, the United States has influenced the
course of international disputes through sponsorship of negoti-
ation. Sponsorship of international negotiations seems to offer
the best of all possible worlds. It's peaceful. It's voluntary. The
solution that results reflects the views of the participants them-
selves. Solutions that reflect the genuine interests of the partici-
pants are likely to be more durable and fair.
And, of course, mediation is cheap-relatively speaking.
Certainly, sponsorship of negotiations can draw considerably on
United States diplomatic resources, as top State Department
people shuttle around for weeks, months, or years. Sometimes
the United States makes enemies from its role as mediator, and
it is never smart to acquire enemies unnecessarily. However,
sponsorship of mediation has to be compared to other available
options. Direct military involvement can be extremely costly in
money and lives, and the costs are highly public. Ignoring prob-
lems can be even worse, in the long run-wounds fester and
infections spread.
A successful mediation is well worth the costs. Ideally, two
states tl).at were former enemies solve their problem peacefully
and in accordance with mutually agreeable terms. Bloodshed is
avoided. International law is respected. And sponsorship of a
successful mediation effort both enhances American prestige,
and surrounds us with the warm moral glow of having done
good for the world. If mediation fails, only the two states them-
selves are to blame-their unwillingness to compromise cannot
be blamed on us. Mediation appears to be a good investment of
State Department time.
Mediation is cheap, but I want to argue that it is far from
morally trouble free. There are two aspects of mediation that
make it look morally attractive: its supposed neutrality and its
supposed voluntarism. The apparent neutrality of mediation
comes from the supposition that the United States is not acting
out of its own interests but simply from the desire to assist the
participating states. The apparent voluntarism comes from the
supposition that the two participating states have come together
of their own free will, and any solution that results from media-
tion is one the parties chose.
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Both of these suppositions should be challenged. The first is
neutrality. There is considerably more United States interest
involved in most mediation efforts than is commonly acknowl-
edged, and it is considerably harder to root out the influence of
United States interests than is usually recognized. The second is
voluntarism. What seems to be a mutual acceptance of the pro-
cess and outcome of mediation is frequently coerced, to a greater
or lesser degree. Where the relationship between the two disput-
ing states is one of pressure and intimidation, mediation merely
ratifies the underlying power inequality. While this may be
unavoidable, it is hardly a cause for American moral self con-
gratulation.
II. NEUTRALITY
While there has been little systematic moral criticism of
mediation as an approach to international disputes, there are
some points on which general agreement probably exists. Cer-
tain principles are obvious, such as that mediation ought not to
be taken as an opportunity for the mediator to further its own
agenda. The mediator should be an "honest broker." Many of the
difficulties with mediation stem, ultimately, from the possibility
of self interest on the part of the mediator.
The most obvious forms of conflict of interest, however, are
not the only ones. In certain respects, it could even be said, they
are not the most dangerous ones. The fact that "neutrality" is an
ambiguous concept means that a mediator has great latitude to
quietly further national interests under the guise of maintaining
an even handed posture. The United States becomes involved in
mediation, typically, because there is some United States inter-
est to be served; and while these interests are sometimes conso-
nant with the interests of other states in the region (or the in-
terests of the world community) there is no guarantee that such
is the case.
A The Risk ofHidden Conflict ofInterests
The most obvious form of conflict of interest is the simple
desire to see one party prevail over the other. This can happen
because of crass economic or strategic interests; or it may result
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from more diffuse sympathy factors arising out of long term
historical connections, common language, or ethnic affinities. It
is this simple form of conflict of interest that is most likely to be
conceived as the moral problem for mediation. This form of con-
flict of interest is indeed important, but exposing such conflicts
is hardly enough.
Sometimes the conflict of interest is as direct as in the fol-
lowing hypothetical. Assume that State A and State B have a
territorial dispute. It is widely suspected that the area in dis-
pute -has large oil reserves. State A has historically done busi-
ness with a particular American oil company and has in fact
negotiated with that oil company for exploration rights in the
event that it is successful in obtaining sovereignty over the area.
The particular American oil company has strong ties with the
American government.
Here, the conflict of interest is evident. At the worst, the
United States might offer its services as mediator in the dispute
specifically in order to secure sovereignty for State A and the oil
concession for the American company. It might conceal the role
of American oil interests in resolving the dispute and deliberate-
ly pressure State B to accept a territorial settlement that gives
the lion's share of the oil rich areas to State A.
But the conflict of interest might instead be more subtle.
Perhaps the American mediator appreciates that he or she has
an obligation to remain neutral. But he or she happens to be
considerably more familiar with the arguments of State A than
the arguments of State B. State A's perspective may simply
appear more reasonable because it is more familiar. And the
greater familiarity may arise out of the long tradition of good
relationships between A and the United States-fostered, per-
haps, in part by the longstanding commercial ties. The mediator
may not be able to separate fact from sympathy in such circum-
stances.
Of course, the degree of prejudice existing in a particular
case is likely to be controversial. There is a natural human ten-
dency to think that someone is biased against you simply be-
cause he or she disagrees; mediators that attempt to find a mid-
dle ground are likely to be thought biased by both sides of a
dispute. But the general point remains. To the extent that medi-
ation is used as a front for furtherance of self interest, it is not
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morally defensible. This point should be uncontroversial in the
abstract, although often difficult to apply in practice.
Precisely because this point is so morally obvious we will
not dwell on it here. The reason for noting the point, however, is
twofold. First, it is a genuine concern (and a legitimate one) of
states entered into mediated negotiations. It must be taken
seriously because-although morally not very subtle-it is in
practice of undeniable importance. Second, it is not the only
concern. A mediator may examine his or her conscience and
determine that he or she is really acting out of disinterested
motives such as promotion of international peace or achievement
of a just result, rather than crass economic or strategic moti-
vation. But this should be only the start of the self-examination,
not the conclusion. The mediator may think that he or she is
acting out of admirable neutral motives, but that assumption of
neutrality must be critically examined.
B. The Meaning of "Neutrality"
The neutrality argument goes as follows.
It is conceded that a mediator should be an honest broker-that it
should not go into mediation with a secret agenda offurthering its
own self interest. But so long as the mediator adopts a posture of
neutrality, mediation is morally desirable. The risk in practice
exists, but the solution is to only mediate in cases where self inter-
est on the part of the mediator does not distort the process. Value
neutral mediation is the best solution.
This is more or less correct in principle, but the problem lies
in putting the argument into practice. It is not just a question of
rooting out cases where the mediator is secretly trying to further
crass self interest. There are also important questions about
what neutrality means. A mediator might genuinely think that
he or she is being neutral, but he acting out of morally uncertain
motivations.
c. Three Types ofNeutrality
There are at least three different approaches that might be
characterized as neutral, and therefore the correct approach.
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First, the mediator might attempt to be completely indifferent to
the result and act as a go-between whose only objective is to
help formulate a solution that the parties will accept. For pur-
poses of convenience, we can call this "indifference." Second, the
mediator might attempt to influence the process in order to
bring about a just result, with "justice" being defined according
to some neutral set of principles. We will call this "neutral jus-
tice." Third, the mediator might work to bring about a solution
that is "best" from the point of view of general policy inter-
ests-policies which are not slanted towards the interests of the
mediator, but reflect the interests of the world community as a
whole. We can call this "neutral community interest."
Return to our earlier example about the territorial dispute
between states A and B. We can concede that America should
not use the mediation effort to further the hidden interests of
U.S. oil companies. What then should its objective be?
1. The first model of neutrality-indifference-would be to
bring the two parties together to any solution that they might
both adopt. It wouldn't matter what solution was adopted, so
long as they both agreed to it.
2. The second model of neutrality-neutral justice-would
be to coax the negotiations towards the side of the state that had
the better legal claim to the area. It might be argued that "State
A has the better legal and historical claim, and we ought to
encourage State B to recognize this."
3. The third model of neutrality-neutral community inter-
ests-would take into account broader interests of the regional
or world community as a whole. "What really matters is that the
two states stop fighting, because their dispute is destabilizing
the region. We should encourage A (or, B) to compromise be-
cause otherwise B (or, A) is never going to give up its claims,
and lay down its arms."
In any given problem, the mediator's perspective is likely to
be a combination of all three, in varying degrees. The mediator
may start out with the sense that he or she should be totally
indifferent regardless of which side is more reasonable or per-
suasive. But the justice element, in some cases, may be so clear
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and undeniable that it comes to dominate the others, especially
once the mediator becomes more familiar with the situation. In
other cases general community interests may dominate, either
because it is unclear what justice requires or because the region-
al concerns are extraordinarily pressing.
These elements are therefore likely to exist in competition
in the mediator's mind, in some undifferentiated way, all con-
tributing to some half articulated sense about what is the right
way to approach the particular problem. All three might be
characterized as neutral, although they are neutral in different
ways. Which of these is morally preferable, and an acceptable
posture for American mediators?
III. INDIFFERENCE VERSUS NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
At first it might seem that, in mediation, the clear choice is
the first of these. It seems the most neutral of all, and therefore
the one most suitable for a mediator-it seems to be the posture
of the genuine "honest broker." "Neutral justice," one might say,
"is for judges." A mediator is not a judge; looking for the correct
answer. A mediator is simply trying to put an end to the dis-
pute.
But the problems with complete value neutrality are imme-
diately obvious. Oomplete value neutrality is one thing when
both sides have good colorable claims, and when both sets of
claims are genuinely held. But should a mediator really be neu-
tral as between the claims of both sides when it is clear that one
side is simply bullying, or is hugely inflating its claims in order
to maximize its share in the eventual compromise? Mediation
that treats all claims as equal is a tool for oppression of the
weak by the strong. It encourages bad faith by treating bad faith
claims and good faith claims as equal.
The problem with indifference is that there sometimes real-
ly are rights and wrongs. We would not want to be value neutral
ifwe were asked to intervene on behalf of an oppressed minority
group living in a genocidal dictatorship. Nor should we be value
neutral when one state's territory has been invaded and wrong-
fully annexed by one of its neighbors. Sometimes the point of
mediation should be to obtain protection or redress for persons
who have truly been wronged. In such cases, indifference seems
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less appealing morally than neutral justice.
Neutral justice requires an effort to influence the outcome to
be, as nearly as practicable, the "correct" one. This is particu-
larly clear where gross human rights abuses are at stake; obvi-
ously neutrality between the perpetrators and the victims is not
defensible. But as between states, mediation can also help to
further the cause of justice. In our case of A and B's territorial
dispute, A may genuinely be the victim of a violation of its
rights. B may have seized the territory by force, in violation of
existing international boundaries. It may be brutally suppress-
ing local resistance from the citizens of A who were living in the
area, butchering them or forcing them off their land. In such
circumstances, how can it be right to be neutral? Why is the
proper role of the mediator a role of value neutrality?
The choice between indifference and the promotion of neu-
tral principle is often not an easy one. Most third party media-
tors would probably choose the former in some circumstances
and the latter in others. One danger is that this choice will be
influenced by self interest, so that the presence or absence of an
American interest dictates whether the United States takes a
stand or remains indifferent. We will return to the problems in
how this choice is made after examining the third understanding
of what "neutrality" requires.
IV. NEUTRAL PROMOTION OF COMMUNITY INTERESTS
The third form of "neutrality" is promotion of general com-
munity interests. What it has in common with the other two
forms of neutrality is that it is "disinterested" on the part of the
mediating state. However, it is distinctive in that the point of
view that it adopts is the general interests of the states in the
region or in the world at large. It is perhaps the most commonly
adopted "neutral posture" for mediators who are likely to become
involved in a mediation precisely because the existence of a
dispute is endangering regional peace.
Return to our example of the territorial dispute between
States A and B. Perhaps A is an aggressive and belligerent
state, and any solution that does not give it the territory will
lead it to act on its dissatisfaction by causing trouble. Or, per-
haps, A is internally weak and its government is likely to topple
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and be replaced by one that is far worse. From the perspective of
what would be beneficial to general community interests, it is
therefore best to let A get what it wants even though it has no
persuasive claim. So, reasons the United States, in our media-
tion effort we should throw our weight behind State A to
strengthen its current government.
A similar sort of consequentialist view of "neutrality" under-
lies the U.S. mediation effort in Kosovo. Located in the former
Yugoslavia and now under Serbian rule, Kosovo was struggling
for autonomy or sovereign independence. The United States
opposed complete independence, one reason being that indepen-
dence for Kosovo could destabilize the region. Independence for
Kosovo could set off a spiral of independence movements as
other relatively small geographical areas assert their own desire
for autonomy. Independence for Kosovo (in the American view)
is bad for the region in the long run. The inhabitants of that
region (ninety percent ethnic Albanians) should instead be pres-
sured to settle for some form of regional autonomy inside Serbia.
One can see how this solution might be characterized as
"neutral." It is neutral in the sense that it is motivated by a
disinterested concern for the long range good of all. However,
one can also easily see why the inhabitants of Kosovo might not
appreciate being told that they must bear the costs of furthering
regional stability themselves. From their point of view, the Ser-
bian government has shown itself to be brutal and vicious, with
no long term willingness to respect Kosovo's right to control by
the local inhabitants. Why (they might legitimately ask) should
we be placed under a genocidal regime in order to reinforce a
regional stability that we do not even want?
Arrayed against this argument of neutral community inter-
est was an argument of neutral principle. Precisely because the
Serbian regime was guilty of gross human rights abuses, the
United States took a moral stand in favor of protecting the
Kosovo Albanians. A balance was struck between the community
interest of maintaining Serbian borders intact and protection of
human rights. How precisely this accommodation was
struck-how community interests and neutral principles were
weighed and balanced-is entirely obscure, and a topic fit for
serious moral scrutiny. How well this unexplained accommoda-
tion will work in the long run remains to be seen.
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The choice between indifference, neutral justice, and com-
munity interest is often not an easy one. Unfortunately, the
decision which posture to adopt is often not clearly thought out
in a mediator's mind. Sometimes the choice is made
unreflectively, without any awareness even that a choice is be-
ing made. Even worse, what sometimes happens in practice is
that the choice whether to maintain complete indifference or to
try to promote justice turns on the interest of the mediator's own
country.
A mediator acts in largely unexamined ways. Shuttle diplo-
macy is an art and not a science, and in particular it is an art
that has no pre-ordained rules. Whatever works tends to be seen
as good. Sometimes mediators get results by methods just as
devious as anything employed by the participants. But even
when the methods are fairly honest they are likely to be deeply
hidden. If a mediator chooses to reveal evidence or make argu-
ments that are of advantage to one side, it may not be known
whether this was selective. When he stays aloof from the merits
of the dispute he can congratulate himself on his professionalism
and "neutrality". When he takes sides, he can congratulate him-
self on standing up for justice. When regional interests in peace
and stability are protected, the mediator declares that the ulti-
mate objective-peaceful resolution of the dispute in accordance
with the agreement of the two parties-has been achieved.
What goes wholly unexamined from the outside is the choice
whether to take a stand or not, and whether the decision when
to take a stand is itself a product of interest. The very choice
between these two may be made in accordance with the hidden
agenda of the country mediating the disputes. The potential
problem, in other words, is that the mediating state will choose
to push for the "just," principled solution when that works out to
the mediating state's advantage, but will work to subordinate
justice to broader policies when the broader policies coincide
with self interest. Where it has no interest in either "justice" or
regional community interest, it will remain indifferent.
If the suspicion is well founded, then the choice to try to
further general neutral policies, or to try to pursue the just
result, cloaks what is really at issue. Either approach can be
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rationalized as "neutral" but the selective adoption first of one
posture and then of the other can only be understood as media-
tor bias.
VI. VOLUNTARISM
We said earlier that there were two ways of getting around
the potential moral difficulties posed by mediation. The first was
to insist that the mediator adopt a posture of strict neutrality;
and we have now seen that this objective is considerably more
difficult than it first appears, because there are different com-
peting visions of what "neutrality" means in this context.
The second response points to mediation's voluntarism.
Even a solution that is proposed by a mediator acting on self
interest may still be in the interests of the participant states. If
A and B both are willing to adopt the solution, it might be said,
then this is what really matters. The fact that they are willing
to adopt it shows that they are better off than if the mediation
effort had not occurred.
What matters ultimately is that the solution was approved by the
participant states, and not anything about the process that gave
rise to the solution. The best protection against self-interested
mediation is the participant states' appreciation of their own self
interest. So long as the solution is accepted voluntarily, it is en-
tirely irrelevant whether it also coincidentally happens to further
some interest of the mediating state.
The fact that mediation does not rely on force largely ac-
counts for its escape from moral scrutiny. The very solution that
results from mediation might be considered unacceptable if it
was imposed by force. Aside from the practical advantages to the
United States-domestically, involvement is much more palat-
able when American lives are not at stake-tremendous moral
advantages seem to follow from the fact that the outside involve-
ment is through persuasion. In the final analysis, the solution
proposed by a mediator must be accepted by the parties. The
fact that the parties accept it (one assumes) is the ultimate test
of the solution's legitimacy.
I want to argue that this apparent advantage is superficial
and that it masks the very real moral dangers that accompany
the role of mediation. First, the voluntariness of the solution
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may disguise the fact that the solution offers widely imbalanced
gains to the two parties: one state may benefit considerably
more than the other. Second, often, there is nothing "voluntary"
about the solution brought about through mediation-even when
the solution is "voluntarily" accepted. The solution may simply
compare favorably with being brutalized by a more powerful
neighbor.
A. Gains from Trade
To understand the superficiality of the "voluntarism" of
mediation, we can compare the paradigm of voluntarism, the
domestic contract. Contracts are defended on the grounds that
they are voluntarily entered into, and even though this is a vast
oversimplification, there is some truth to the matter. Buyer and
seller agree to a particular exchange, and the fact that they
agree to this exchange is the best evidence of the fact that the
particular exchange makes them both better off. If it makes
them both better off than they would be without the contract,
what kind of reasonable objection could there be?
One important basis for skepticism about even a purely
voluntary domestic contract is that the agreement may unevenly
divide the "gains from trade." Presumably, the buyer gains as
much incremental advantage from having the new goods as the
money which he paid as their price; similarly, the seller attaches
more value to having the purchase price than he did from hav-
ing the goods themselves. Both get "gains from trade." But if the
seller is a large and powerful commercial entity, and the buyer a
small and ignorant consumer, then the profit that accrues to the
seller may be much larger than the benefit that accrues to the
buyer. The seller reaps the lion's share of the benefits of the
transaction. Thus even a voluntary transaction may be unfair, in
the sense that the benefits are unbalanced.
In domestic contracting situations, the usual response to
this objection would be as follows. The smaller or weaker party's
best remedy is to shop around. If the profit margin that the
seller demands is disproportionately large there will probably be
some other seller that will sell for less. The possibility of compe-
tition from other sellers will drive down the price, and the buyer
will be able to find a deal that offers a more balanced set of
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gains from trade. This argument is certainly somewhat unrealis-
tic in particular markets (the classic example being the poorly
informed consumer in an inner city market who has little ability
to shop around), but undeniably the appeal of the "voluntarism"
argument in the domestic contracting context lies in the hope
that in many cases this paradigm holds true.
In international mediation, this paradigm does not hold true
in the least. The typical international problem that is subjected
to mediation is what would, in domestic law and economic
terms, be described as a "bilateral monopoly." State A and State
B have a dispute. In most cases, this is because they are neigh-
bors geographically, but sometimes the dispute arises out of
some other sort of longstanding historical relationship. The two
states cannot go out and shop around for some other state to
have a dispute with. The problem that is solved through media-
tion is a particular problem between two particular states.
In such circumstances, the fact that both benefit from a
particular solution reached through mediation does not in any
way address the question, which of the two states benefits more?
There may be a number of different solutions that all improve
the situation of both of the two states, but they are likely to di-
vide the gains in different ways. Some may be hugely beneficial
to State A, with only minimal benefits to State B. Others may
be the opposite, and others may divide the gains equally.
In any successful mediation effort, there comes a point when
one solution achieves prominence over the others. Exactly how
and when this happens, and which solution it is that achieves
prominence, is largely a function of the approach of the media-
tor. A mediator can play an active role in many different ways.
He or she can aggressively set the agenda for discussions, may
be able to publicize his or her own favored interpretation of the
problem to the world community, can try taking sides-siding
rhetorically with one state or the other, or can simply take sub-
stantive positions that certain demands are reasonable and
others are unreasonable. The mediator's actions have a pro-
nounced effect on which of the many potential proposals
achieves salience. Once attention becomes focused on a particu-
lar solution, it gathers weight and strength through the histori-
cal attention that has been focused on it, and comes to dominate
the process of arriving at the ultimate resolution.
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While the mediator ultimately is limited by the range of
options that the parties are willing to accept, the mediator may
have tremendous influence in steering the process towards one
rather than another of the mutually acceptable solutions. The
mediator, in other words, has tremendous influence in the ulti-
mate division of the gains from trade.
As amongst the range of mutually acceptable solutions, it
often falls largely to the mediator to make the choice. The possi-
ble unfairness here is obvious, particularly when the discretion
to make the choice is in the hands of a state with views or inter-
ests of its own. The ultimate solution may be "voluntary" in the
sense that both states agree to it, but it can hardly be described
as "fair."
B. The Background of Coercion
One might still say that even if it cannot ensure that the
benefits will be evenly divided, at least mediation makes both
sides better off than they would have been without it, and that
is something to be grateful for. This is often said domestically
about deals in which the benefits from trade are unequally di-
vided. But once again the contrast between the conditions for
domestic bargaining and the conditions for international bar-
gaining is instructive.
We just noted that in international bargaining of the sort
described here, the existence of a bilateral monopoly increases
the risk that the division of gains will be radically unequal.
Another distinctive characteristic of international bargaining is
that it takes place outside a legal system with the power to
defend legal rights. Coercion is always in the background, and
the possibility of coercion alters the range of solutions that ap-
pear "beneficial." Even a grossly unfair arrangement may be
preferable to military occupation.
In domestic law, you are not allowed to threaten the lives or
property of other persons and then get paid not to carry through
on the threat. There are legal penalties in domestic criminal law
for making threats, and you cannot turn a profit by selling the
right not to carry through on them. In domestic cases,
"voluntariness" is measured by comparing the outcome of the
transaction to the entitlements in place prior to the transaction.
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The seller has legal rights to her merchandise, and the buyer
has legal rights to his money. After the exchange, the seller is
better off to have the money in hand and the buyer is better off
with the merchandise." The new set of entitlements is more satis-
fying to both than the old set of entitlements.
In international law there is no legal system in place that
can protect such a background set of entitlements. (Some may
say that no entitlements even exist in such a situation, but this
is a difficult jurisprudential question that we do not have to
address.) When A and B have a dispute, the stronger of the two
may threaten force to get what it wants. It is typically at this
point that the mediator arrives, motivated no doubt by the de-
sire to avoid bloods~ed and to dampen the possibility of spread-
ing violence.
The mediator may be able to induce A and B to agree to
some particular solution to their problems. But the solution will
be voluntary only in the sense that A and B both think that they
are better off with this solution than without it. This is not to
say that the solution protects what one or both are entitled
to-that it improves upon their entitlements through voluntary
exchange. The comparison that one or both may be forced into
making is: am I better off with this negotiated arrangement, or
should I take my chances on a military solution that will reflect
might, rather than justice?
c. The Problem ofAppeasement
All mediations start with some problem between two or
more countries (or possibly nonstate actors). So long as it ap-
pears that they can manage the conflict for the foreseeable fu-
ture, without it spilling over into other states either militarily or
economically, whether they ask for outside mediation or not is
likely to be their own private matter. Once the dispute gets
larger and threatens to have external impact, the two states will
come under pressure from the outside world to agree to media-
tion.
It should be kept in mind that mediators rarely become
involved through simple desire to see justice done. The more
likely motivations are either the desire to further the interests
of an ally or the desire to limit the inconvenience caused by a
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dispute to other countries with geographical or economic link-
ages. Both of these motivations are intensely self interested.
Neither places a premium on doing justice.
The would-be mediator has a choice to make about what
posture to adopt. If it is allied with the state that appears to be
in the right, the choice is easy. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the
western powers automatically adopted a posture of angered
righteousness. It was clear that Iraq was in the wrong and Ku-
wait was in the right; and it was also clear that western inter-
ests favored Kuwait over Iraq. So the strategic choice was easy.
That case did not end in mediation, of course. Because the west-
ern interest was strong and Iraq was intransigent, it ended up
in war.
What should the United States do, however, when it is not
apparent that its ally is in the right? Right and wrong may be
unclear; or they may be clear, but America's ally may be on the
wrong side. Here, the mediator is likely to adopt a different
posture. The point that will be emphasized is the necessity to
damp down conflict. "Right and wrong must be put aside, for it
is our job to strive merely to put an end to the conflict. The
mediator must be neutral."
Thus the choice between whether to push for a solution
based on justice, or to push for a solution based on peace, is
largely influenced by an unexpressed awareness of where the
bread is buttered. Either posture can be defended as neutral,
but accepting that characterization is misleading when the
choice between them is based on self interest. From the point of
view of the state that is in the right, there is nothing "neutral"
about a mediator that takes a position of indifference to values
or pursuit of some general objective such as regional stability.
Now bring in the element of background coercion. If the
dispute has gone as far as physical violence (this is true of most
of the important mediations going on today) then always in the
background is the question what will happen if the mediation
effort fails. To cast the process as voluntary and peaceful is
entirely unrealistic. The state that stands to lose out militarily if
the conflict reemerges is not engaged in mediation on a purely
voluntary basis. Concessions made are not made voluntarily. If
the powerful mediating state continues to insist that the impor-
tant thing is to reach agreement in order to preserve or rein-
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state the peace the only term that fairly characterizes the pro-
cess is appeasement.
Appeasement is, indeed, the primary objective in many
mediations. Appeasement is of course a wholly neutral pro-
cess-its only objective is the generally desirable one of preserv-
ing international peace. And it is voluntary, if you can get the
victim to go along with it. But the fact that appeasement can be
articulated as procuring neutral benefits, and that the weaker
state may be pressured into accepting it "voluntarily," is not
enough.
VII. CONCLUSION
That there are serious moral problems with the way that
mediation is conducted is not an argument against mediation as
an approach to international disputes. Mediation is sometimes
better than the other alternatives; and that ultimately is the
best that can be said about it.
The serious moral problems that arise with mediation do,
however, give good reason for critical examination of particular
United States mediation efforts. Mediation is an exercise of co-
ercive power just like other military power or economic pressure.
The peacemakers of the world need to take a cold look in the
mirror and ask themselves to what degree they are simply re-
flecting their own self interest, and to what extent this is justifi-
able.
HeinOnline -- 51 Ala. L. Rev. 732 1999-2000
